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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 1988, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. (Hoffman)
hired Jose Castro to operate various blending machines at its chemical
manufacturing plant.2 After Castro had worked at the company for
several months, a union organizing campaign began there.3 One
month after Castro showed support for the union, Hoffman fired him
and three other employees who were also union supporters.4 Upon
investigating the matter, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
found that Hoffman had unlawfully selected Castro and the other
employees "in order to rid itself of known union supporters," and had
therefore engaged in "wrongful termination" in violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).5
At the compliance hearing, however, Castro revealed that his
immigration documents were fraudulent.6  Consequently, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that Castro was not eligible for
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1. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
2. Id. at 140.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. (citing 306 N.L.R.B. 100 (1992)). NLRA § 8(a)(3) prohibits discrimination "in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization." Id. at 140 n.1 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)).
6. 314 N.L.R.B. 683,685 (1994).
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the usual remedies associated with wrongful termination, e.g., backpay
and reinstatement.7 Subsequently, the NLRB overturned the ALJ's
holding with respect to backpay.8 After the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals denied review and enforced the NLRB's
order,' the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and by its
decision, resolved the circuit split over whether undocumented
immigrants should be entitled to backpay under the NLRA. °
In its 5-4 decision, the Court reasoned that awarding"undocumented aliens"'" backpay under the NLRA violates and
undermines the immigration policy set out by Congress in the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),"2 which makes it illegal
for undocumented immigrants to be employed or to obtain
employment. 3  As such, the Court held that IRCA forecloses
undocumented immigrants from receiving backpay under the
NLRA.14
This Note explains why the Supreme Court's decision in
Hoffman threatens to do the exact opposite of what the Court
intended. Specifically, while the majority's opinion purports to
maintain the integrity of IRCA, it will likely undermine the Act by
encouraging employers to hire undocumented workers.'S In addition,
the opinion's fundamentally problematic reasoning has caused much
7. Id. at 686.
8. 326 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1998).
9. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 208 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff d on
reh'g en banc 237 F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
10. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 142 n.2.
1I. In immigration case law, the term "undocumented alien" is commonly used to describe
a person without legal immigration status. See, e.g., Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140. However, the
author finds the term "alien" degrading; therefore, whenever possible, she chooses not to use it.
Nevertheless, the terms "immigrant" and "non-immigrant" connote certain types of immigration
status under the law. See, e.g., The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101,
1101(a)(15), 1153 (2001). For purposes of this Note, "undocumented immigrant" will be
synonymous with "illegal alien" and "undocumented worker" will be synonymous with "illegal
alien worker." The use of the term "alien" is preserved when it appears in quoted materials and
when it is necessary to describe a person that is not a citizen or a national of the United States.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
12. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140.
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(1997).
14. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140.
15. See Irene Zopath Hudson & Susan Schenk, Note, America: Land of Opportunity or
Exploitation?, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 351, 362 (2002) (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt.
2, at 8-9 (1986)); see also Rebecca Smith & Maria Blanco, Used and Abused: The Treatment of
Undocumented Victims of Labor Law Violations Since Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB,
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund & National Employment Law Project,
8 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 890 (Jan. 2003),
available at http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/maldef/20nelp%2Epdf (last visited July 20,
2003).
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confusion and generated substantial litigation in federal and state
courts over a very short period of time: Employer defendants have
either been misled to believe or have opportunistically argued that
Hoffman immunizes them from liability in a variety of labor and
employment cases involving undocumented immigrants. 16
Nevertheless, the post-Hoffman cases suggest that most courts are
attempting to perform damage control by limiting Hoffman to its facts
and staking out areas of labor and employment law that are not
affected by the holding. However, a small number of courts have been
less careful, allowing Hoffman to have influence beyond its reasonable
scope.
In addition to creating confusion, the Hoffman decision offends
traditional notions of statutory construction by departing from both
the text of the statute and the legislative intent. Furthermore, the
holding has the de facto effect of forging a new way to investigate
IRCA violations and grants employers a new defense to liability.
Moreover, in effect, the holding condones employer violations of
IRCA. In light of the foregoing and Hoffman's threat to immigration,
labor, and employment law and policy, Congress must clarify its
intent or the Court must overturn its decision.17
Following this Introduction, Part II of this Note provides some
background by introducing basic issues faced by undocumented
immigrants in the U.S. workforce and by outlining the legal landscape
pertinent to the Hoffman decision and subsequent case law. It also
summarizes the facts, the majority opinion, and the dissent in
Hoffman. By examining memoranda and announcements from federal
agencies that enforce the labor and employment laws at issue in
Hoffman, Part III analyzes how lower courts and agencies have
interpreted Hoffman. Part III also outlines subsequent cases,
identifying principles and themes they have generated.18 Part IV
explains why courts should continue to limit Hoffman to its facts and
why the Court should overturn the case or Congress should clarify its
intent. A summary and concluding remarks are presented in Part V.
16. See Smith & Blanco, supra note 15, at 890.
17. See, e.g., id. at 894.
18. For a more exhaustive survey of cases subsequent to Hoffman, as well as a discussion of
immigrant experiences after Hoffman, see generally Smith & Blanco, supra note 15.
2003]
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II. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND THE
HOFFMAN DECISION
A. Immigrants in the U.S. Workforce
Immigrant workers, "regardless of their legal status or
nationality,"19 are entitled to some legal protection under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA),2° the anti-discrimination laws,2" and the
NLRA,22 among other laws concerning labor and employment.23
These protections are particularly significant because employers often
exploit unauthorized alien workers24 (or "undocumented workers") for
their lack of political power, and their willingness to tolerate poor
working conditions and low wages.25
Despite the protections afforded by the labor, employment, and
anti-discrimination laws, undocumented workers often do not know
that they have rights.26 Furthermore, those who do know they have
rights may be afraid to assert them for fear of employer retaliation,
including being reported to immigration authorities.27 For many
undocumented immigrants, such reporting could end in removal,
19. Karen A. Herrling, Federal Employment Laws and Immigrant Workers, IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS, Nov. 2000, available at WL 00-11 Immigr. Briefings 1; see Eric Schnapper, Righting
Wrongs Against Immigrant Workers: A Supreme Court Decision Raised Difficult Questions About
What Remedies Are Available to Immigrants Who Lack Work Authorization when Their Federal or
State Rights Are Violated, TRIAL, Mar. 2003, at 46.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2001).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 151(3) (2001).
23. Herrling, supra note 19, at 1.
24. For an overview of statistics about undocumented immigrants as workers in the United
States, see Rebecca Smith et al., National Employment Law Project, Undocumented Workers:
Preserving Rights and Remedies After Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB 1-2 (Apr. 2003),
available at http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/wlghoff04O3o3%2Epdf (last visited July 28,
2003). Smith et al. also point out that "[m]any of the industries that are major employers of the
undocumented are also known for low wages, dangerous conditions, and frequent violations of
labor laws." Id. at 2.
25. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) et al., 2001 WL
1631648, at *11, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-1595) [hereinafter Brief of ACLU]. The
U.S. Congress Select Commission on Immigrant and Refugee Policy ("SCRIP"), which studies
immigration and recommends legislative responses, considered the appeal of foreign workers to
U.S. employers and concluded that U.S. employers have had an economic incentive to hire
undocumented immigrant workers because such workers "are vulnerable to exploitation" and
employers "prey on their fear." Id. (citing 132 CONG. REC. H9708, 9712 (daily ed. Oct. 9,
1986)). See, e.g., Smith & Blanco, supra note 15, at 893; cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae: Labor, Civil
Rights and Immigrants' Rights Organizations in the United States, reprinted in I SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST. 795, 803-806 (2003) (explaining that a large portion of low wage, high risk
employment in the United States is performed by undocumented immigrants); Hudson &
Schenk, supra note 15, at 362 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8-9 (1986)).
26. Herrling, supra note 19, at 29.
27. Hudson & Schenk, supra note 15, at 369.
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among other immigration consequences. 28  Thus, undocumented
workers have a great incentive to keep quiet and to avoid conflicts with
employers.29
Notably, regardless of their lack of political power and the risk of
exploitation and deportation, undocumented immigrants continue to
flood into the United States." For many, even some of the worst
working conditions in the United States are more tolerable or
profitable than what they find in their home countries.3 For others,
basic political freedom draws them, despite their limited ability to
influence or participate in the political system.3 2  They come
regardless of changes in legislation or policy, seeking the "American
Dream" or simply a better life.33 Recognizing that undocumented
immigrants are not easily deterred from obtaining illegal employment,
laws drafted to discourage illegal immigration and employment
practices typically focus on the behavior of employers.34
B. The Legal Landscape
To understand the significance of the Court's rationale in
Hoffman, one must first be familiar with the purpose and scope of the
U.S. immigration and employment laws pertinent to the discussion of
undocumented immigrant workers and backpay. The following
discussion provides a brief overview of the relevant legal landscape.
1. An Overview of the Immigration Laws
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the creation of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, and the enactment of the U.S.A.
Patriot Act,3S the Bush Administration's immigration policy has
become focused on controlling the U.S. borders for the prevention of
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Brief of ACLU, supra note 25, at *12.
31. See, e.g., A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 412 (1995).
Notably, a final report issued by SCRIP stated that "however low the salaries of
undocumented/illegal aliens in the United States, the studies indicate that their U.S. wages are
many times that of previous wages in the home country." Brief of ACLU, supra note 25, at *10-
11.
32. See R. Paul Faxon, Comment, Employer Sanctions for Hiring Illegal Aliens: A Simplistic
Solution to a Complex Problem, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 203, 242 (1984).
33. Id.
34. See Brief of ACLU, supra note 25, at *2; see also Hudson & Schenk, supra note 15, at
363; Faxon, supra note 32, at 204.
35. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272-402 (Oct. 26, 2001). The statute's purposes are
"[tjo deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law
enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes." Id.
2003]
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terrorism.36  However, the majority of American immigration laws
were not originally designed with that focus; in general, they were
created to protect American jobs for legal workers."7
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA),38 although
amended many times over the years, 9 "continues to be the basic
immigration law of the country."" Through the INA, Congress
granted the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) the power
to regulate the entry and deportation of aliens into and from the
United States.41 In particular, by passing the INA, Congress hoped to
preserve jobs for American workers by regulating immigration.42
However, Congress soon found the INA ineffective for keeping
undocumented workers from entering the U.S. workforce because it
was still legal for employers to hire them.43
To address this shortcoming, in 1986 Congress passed the
IRCA 4 for the general purpose of deterring employers from hiring
undocumented immigrants, deterring illegal immigration, and
preserving employment for U.S. citizens and legal immigrant
workers.4' Notably, much of the legislative history for IRCA suggests
that Congress primarily intended to control the misconduct of
employers, not employees.46 In fact, "unlike efforts to make U.S. jobs
36. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ (last visited July
20, 2003).
37. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892-93 (1983) (citing De Canas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)).
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1537 (2000).
39. For example, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) substantially changed the INA
of 1952 "by inter alia, establishing a new summary removal process to adjudicate claims of aliens
who arrive in the United States without proper documentation." Barapind v. Reno, 72 F. Supp.
2d 1132, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 1999). Specifically, under the IIRIRA, courts are significantly limited
in their jurisdiction to review denial of removal orders. Id.
40. LII: Legal Information Institute, Immigration Law: An Overview, at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/immigration.html (last visited July 20, 2003).
41. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225-1227 (1994). Notably, as of March 2003, the INS was replaced by
other agencies within the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security,
including the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration Services. See U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, DHS Organization, Building a
Secure Homeland, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/themehomel.jsp (last visited Aug. 10,
2003).
42. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 892-93 (citing De Canas, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)).
43. Hudson & Schenk, supra note 15, at 362; see also Brief of ACLU, supra note 25, at *12.
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1997).
45. Hudson & Schenk, supra note 15, at 363 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8-9
(1986)).
46. Brief of ACLU, supra note 25, at *12. For example, Congressman Lungren reportedly
stated that IRCA was directed at employers "who have hired illegal aliens specifically so that
they can exploit them." Id. at *11-12 (citing 132 CONG. REC. H10583, 10596 (daily ed. Oct.
15, 1986)).
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less attractive to immigrant workers, which Congress considered
futile, Congress decided that legislation aimed at reducing employers'
economic incentives to hire undocumented immigrants was more
likely to achieve the desired end" of IRCA.47
In broad terms, IRCA makes it illegal for employers to
knowingly employ undocumented workers and for those workers to
obtain employment without authorization from the INS or by using
false documents.4" Furthermore, if an employer unknowingly hires an
undocumented immigrant, or if that immigrant becomes unauthorized
to work while employed, the employer is required to discharge the
worker upon discovery of the worker's undocumented status.49 To
comply with this duty under IRCA, employers must check
documentation of citizenship or immigration status for all their
employees or face sanctions upon investigation by immigration
authorities. 0
In particular, IRCA includes two statutory mechanisms designed
to increase the cost of hiring undocumented workers."s First, an
employer who is caught hiring unauthorized immigrants is subject to
civil fines ranging from $2502 to $10,000.11 Criminal penalties and
additional fines may be imposed on employers who engage in a"pattern of practice" of hiring undocumented immigrants.54  Second,
IRCA authorizes funds for the U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL)
Wage and Hour Division to enforce employment standards laws on
behalf of undocumented workers.5 5 Through this provision, Congress
recognized that such enforcement furthers IRCA's purpose by
diminishing employers' incentive to hire undocumented workers in
order to take advantage of an easily exploited workforce. 6
47. BriefofACLU, supra note 25, at *12.
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a).
49. Id. § 1324(a)(2). But see Smith et al., supra note 24, at 4-5. Smith et al. posit that INS
has given employers little reason to fear that they will actually be sanctioned for hiring
undocumented immigrants. Id. at 4. In particular, they point out that under IRCA, employers
are free to accept documents "that appear on their face to genuine and to relate to the individual
named." Id. Thus, an employer can "ignore documents it suspects are invalid." Id. Ultimately,
Smith et al. argue that "[riather than an effective deterrent to unlawful immigration, employer
sanctions operate as a club against workers." Id. at 5.
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).
51. BriefofACLU, supra note 25, at *8.
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(i), cited in Schnapper, supra note 19, at 47.
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(e)(4)(iii), cited in Brief of ACLU, supra note 25, at *8.
54. 8 U.S.C. §1324a(f), cited in Brief of ACLU, supra note 25, at *8.
55. Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 111(d), 100 Stat. 3359, cited in Brief of ACLU, supra note 25, at
56. Id.
2003] 239
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In addition to IRCA, Congress also enacted the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), which, among other things, limited immigration documents
considered acceptable for the hiring process and revised the document
fraud provisions.17  These changes included adding more criminal
sanctions against certain employers of undocumented immigrants and
against undocumented employees who use false documents to obtain
employment."8
Underlying all of these immigration laws is concern for the
success of legal workers and the lawfulness of employer conduct. In
addition, members of Congress have shown concern for the treatment
of immigrants themselves, who have been known to endure
exploitative and dangerous working conditions in exchange for meager
compensation. 9
2. An Overview of the Labor and Employment Laws
This subsection introduces the labor and employment laws
invoked in Hoffman and subsequent cases. In general, these laws
include all workers in their definitions of "employee," without regard
to immigration status, in order to best promote safe, healthy, and just
working environments for all workers.6"
The NLRA,61 enforced by the NLRB, regulates relations
between unions and employers in the private sector.62 The general
purpose of the Act is to guarantee the right of employees to organize,
to collectively bargain, and to report unfair labor practices.63 In
addition, the Act posits that these protections "[safeguard] commerce
from injury, impairment, or interruption and [promote] the flow of
57. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 412, 110 Stat. 3009, 3666, cited in Hudson & Schenk, supra note
15, at 364.
58. Hudson & Schenk, supra note 15, at 364.
59. Brief of ACLU, supra note 25, at *21-23.
60. See, e.g., Herrling, supra note 19; Brief of ACLU, supra note 25, at *12-21; Schnapper,
supra note 19, at 46.
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
62. Id.
63. Id.§ 151.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours,
or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees .... It is declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred.
[Vol. 27:233
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commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial
strife and unrest."64 The Act makes a distinct connection between an
employee's freedom to organize and the national interests of
commerce. 65  Overall, the Act aims to protect workers as well as the
national economy.
With similar goals in mind, Congress enacted the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA),66 which strives "to eliminate substandard
working conditions" for all employees. 67 The FLSA, enforced by the
DOL's Wage and Hour Division, established minimum wage,
overtime pay, record keeping, and child labor standards in the United
States.68 In particular, the FLSA requires covered employers to pay
their employees the federal minimum wage and to pay non-exempt
employees one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for
overtime hours worked.69 It also prohibits firing or discriminating
against employees in retaliation for filing complaints or for
participating in a legal proceedings under the FLSA.7" In general, the
Act posits that through its provisions it seeks to protect the "health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers" to promote the "orderly
and fair marketing of goods in commerce. ''71
In addition, to bar employers from discriminating against
individuals in the workplace on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, Congress has passed comprehensive federal anti-
discrimination laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII),72 the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 73 the Age
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2001).
67. Hudson & Schenk, supra note 15, at 366 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)).
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 204-207 (2001).
69. Id. §§ 202, 206, 207(a)(1).
70. Id. § 215(a)(3).
71. Id. §202(a).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to §2000e-17 (1999). The purpose of this statute is as follows:
An Act [t]o enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the
district courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination
in public accommodations, to authorize the attorney General to institute suits to
protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the
Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs,
to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other
purposes.
Preamble, Pub. L. 88-352, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/vii.html (last modified Jan.
15, 1997).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2000). "Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in
an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at the
following rates .... " Id. § 206(a).
2003]
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Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 74 Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 7 and the Civil Rights Act of
1991.76 The basic purposes stated in these laws demonstrate
Congress's commitment to deter employment discrimination and,
when discrimination does occur, to create mechanisms to return
injured employees to the positions they would have enjoyed had there
been no discrimination.77
Finally, state legislatures have enacted workers compensation
laws for the purpose of providing adequate, predictable, and efficient
remedies to employees adversely affected by work-related conditions
that led to work-related injuries.78 In particular, these statutes have
been designed to respond to industrial injuries that cause workers to
incur medical expenses and losses of earnings.79 Although each state
has its own workers compensation statutes, essentially they are all
based on the same model."0 Most of these laws cover all private and
most public employers,8" and they generally protect only those
employees injured during the course of employment.8 2
It is against the backdrop of these laws that the Supreme Court
decided Hoffman. If limited to its facts, Hoffman only concerns cases
in which undocumented workers seek backpay for wrongful
termination under the NLRA. However, Hoffman has already been
applied in cases that fall outside a narrow reading of the case. Indeed,
because the Court in Hoffman spoke so generally about employment
74. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. "It is... the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the
impact of age on employment." Id. § 621(b).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2002).
76. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The purpose of the Act is "to amend the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to strengthen and improve Federal civil rights laws, to provide for damages in
cases of intentional employment discrimination, to clarify provisions regarding disparate impact
actions, and for other purposes." Id. The Act goes on to state, in part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
77. Id.
78. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, CHARLES B. CRAVER, ELINOR P. SCHROEDER & ELAINE W.
SHOBEN, EMPLOYMENT LAW § 6.1, at 536 (2d ed. 1999).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. § 6.4, at 541-42.
82. Id. § 6.6, at 552.
[Vol. 27:233
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relationships and immigration policy, Hoffman threatens to undermine
many of the policies and purposes that drove Congress to adopt the
immigration and labor and employment laws discussed above.
C. The Hoffman Decision
This Section introduces the Hoffman opinion. While the
majority spoke boldly about how immigration policy precluded Jos6
Castro from recovering backpay under the NLRA, the dissent
maintained that immigration policy and an award of backpay to Castro
were compatible.
1. The Facts
Jose Castro worked as a blending machine operator in Hoffman's
chemical manufacturing plant."3 After several months of employment
there, Castro joined a union organizing campaign.84 One month later,
Hoffman fired him and three other union supporters.s Three years
after Hoffman fired these workers, the NLRB investigated and found
that the layoff violated Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA86 because
Hoffman fired the workers to rid itself of union supporters.87
Consequently, the NLRB ordered Hoffman to: (1) cease and desist
from further violations of the NLRA; (2) post a detailed notice to its
employees about the remedial order; and (3) offer reinstatement and
backpay to Castro and other wrongfully terminated employees.88
When the parties proceeded to the compliance hearing before an
AL, 9 Castro testified that he had used a friend's birth certificate to
obtain employment at Hoffman.9" Furthermore, there was no
evidence to show that he had ever sought authorization or had been
authorized to work in the United States.9' Castro also testified that he
fraudulently obtained a Social Security card and a California driver's
license in order to obtain employment following his termination at
Hoffman. 92
83. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. NLRA § 8(a)(3) prohibits discrimination "in regard to the tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), cited in Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140 n.1.
87. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140.
88. Id. at 140-41.
89. Id. at 141. The compliance hearing was meant to determine the amount of backpay
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Based on Castro's testimony and the Supreme Court's holding in
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,93 the ALJ held that
Castro was precluded from collecting backpay and from reinstatement
because, under Sure-Tan, backpay is tolled "during any period in
which [a person] is not lawfully authorized to work in this country."9 4
Therefore, because Castro was not working legally under IRCA,9  the
ALJ ordered that he receive no backpay.96
Four years after the ALJ's decision in Hoffman, the NLRB
reversed with respect to withholding backpay.97 The Board explained
that "the most effective way to accommodate and further the
immigration policies embodied in [IRCA] is to provide the protections
and remedies of the [NLRA] to undocumented workers in the same
manner as to other employees."98
After the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied Hoffman's
petition for review, 99 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
resolve the split between those circuits holding that undocumented
workers can collect backpay under the NLRA and one circuit holding
that they cannot. 100
2. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the 5-4 majority in Hoffman, Chief Justice
Rehnquist (joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas) held that federal immigration policy, as expressed by
Congress in IRCA, foreclosed the NLRB from awarding Castro
backpay under the NLRA because he had never been legally
authorized to work in the United States.' Furthermore, Justice
Rehnquist stated that the NLRB had overstepped its authority to
award remedies because awarding Castro backpay would "trench"
upon federal statutes and policies unrelated to its administrative
93. 467 U.S. 883, 892-93 (1984).
94. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 683, 685 (1994).
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
96. Hoffman, 314 N.L.R.B. at 685-86.
97. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. and Casimiro Arauz, 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1060
(1998).
98. Id. (citing A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 414 (1995)).
99. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 208 F.3d 229, 231 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
100. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 142 n.2 (citing NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc.,
134 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that undocumented immigrant workers can collect
backpay under the NLRA); Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers' Union v. NLRB, 795
F.2d 705, 719-20 (9th Cir. 1986) (also holding that undocumented immigrant workers can
collect backpay under the NLRA); Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1121-22
(7th Cir. 1992) (holding that undocumented immigrant workers cannot collect backpay under the
NLRA)).
101. Id. at 140.
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charge.112  Justice Rehnquist also maintained that the purpose of
IRCA would be undermined if backpay were awarded to individuals
without work authorization.' 03
Justice Rehnquist explained that since the NLRB's inception, the
Court has consistently set aside awards of reinstatement or backpay to
employees who, like Castro, were found guilty of "serious illegal
conduct" related to their employment.' For example, in NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., the Court overturned the Board's award
of reinstatement and backpay to employees who engaged in an
unlawful confrontation with law enforcement officials subsequent to a
sit-down strike.' 5 In that case, the Court found that although the
employer had committed serious violations of the NLRA, the NLRB
had no discretion to remedy those violations with reinstatement
because the Court was unable to conclude that Congress could have
wanted employers to retain employees despite their employees' illegal
conduct. '06
In addition, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the NLRB does
not have the discretion to award remedies when doing so trenches
upon federal statutes and policies unrelated to its administrative
charge. 7 He noted that in Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB,'18 the Court
precluded sailors from receiving backpay and reinstatement, despite
their employer's violations of the NLRA, because the sailors
conducted a strike that ended in mutiny, which violated federal
maritime law.0 9 In that case, the Court stated that the NLRB was not
commissioned to operate so "single-mindedly" that it may "ignore
other and equally important [c]ongressional objectives.""'
Similar to the ALJ, Justice Rehnquist also likened Hoffman to
Sure-Tan because he perceived a conflict of laws between IRCA and
the NLRB's preferred remedy for Castro."' In Sure-Tan, two
companies had reported illegal alien employees to the INS in
retaliation for their union activities." 2 Subsequently, the NLRB
102. Id. at 148-49.
103. Id. at 140.
104. Id. at 143.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939)).
107. Id. at 148-49.
108. 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
109. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 143-44.
110. Id. On this point, Justice Rehnquist also discussed NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465
U.S. 513 (1984), Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), and Carpenters v. NLRB,
357 U.S. 93 (1958).
111. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 145 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1983).
112. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 887.
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investigated and found that the employers had violated Section 8(a),
paragraphs (1) and (3) of the NLRA, and consequently, that the
employees should be entitled to reinstatement. 1 3 Nevertheless, when
the Supreme Court reviewed Sure-Tan, it held that the plaintiffs could
not be reinstated because they had voluntarily departed to their home
country of Mexico in order to avoid INS sanctions associated with
deportation; as a result, they could not legally re-enter the United
States to receive their remedy.14
While in Hoffman the NLRB argued that Sure-Tan only affects
recoveries by undocumented immigrants who leave the United States,
Justice Rehnquist clarified that the Court in Sure-Tan actually held
that the NLRB's authority is limited by "federal immigration
policy.""'  He asserted that at the time of Sure-Tan, Congress had not
yet made it a separate criminal offense for an employer to employ an
illegal alien." 6 Since Sure-Tan, Congress changed the legal landscape
by passing IRCA, making it a crime for an unauthorized alien to
subvert the employer verification system by utilizing fraudulent
documents. "7
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the combined effect of Sure- Tan,
Fansteel, cases like Southern S.S. Co., and IRCA meant that the
NLRB did not have the discretion to award Castro backpay." 8
Because Castro obtained work with fraudulent documents, Rehnquist
framed Castro's conduct as seriously illegal and in violation of federal
law." '9 Thus, like the employees in Sure-Tan, Castro could not
recover backpay without trenching on the immigration laws, this time
the IRCA instead of the entry provisions of the INA. 2 '
Justice Rehnquist also criticized the underlying employment
relationships between undocumented workers and employers, stating
that "under the IRCA regime, it is impossible for an undocumented
alien to obtain employment in the United States without some party
contravening explicit congressional policies. '"121 Furthermore, he
emphasized that if the Court were to allow the NLRB to award Castro
backpay, it would essentially condone payment "for years of work not
performed, for wages that could not lawfully have been earned, and for
113. Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 3 of Int'l AFL-CIO, 324 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1987).
114. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 145.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 144-45.
117. Id. at 147-48.
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a job obtained in the first instance by criminal fraud.' ' 22 Moreover,
the Chief Justice stated that "there is no reason to think that
Congress... intended to permit backpay where but for an employer's
unfair labor practices, an alien would have remained in the United
States illegally, and continued to work illegally, all the while
successfully evading apprehension by the authorities., 123  He also
explained that when the NLRB's interpretation of a statute is so far
removed from its expertise, like the interpretation of an immigration
statute, its interpretation of that statute is not entitled to deference
from the Court. 124
Additionally, Justice Rehnquist asserted that awarding backpay
to Castro would not only trivialize the immigration laws but also
condone and encourage future violations. 25 For example, if Castro
had returned to Mexico, he would have been precluded from
collecting backpay because he would have had to violate the entry
provisions of the INA to return and collect it.126 However, if the
Court were to allow the NLRB to award Castro backpay in this case,
Castro would essentially receive backpay for staying in the United
States illegally. 27 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that this result would
create an incentive to break the law. 28 In addition, Castro would not
be able to mitigate damages by obtaining or attempting to obtain new
employment, as the statute requires, "without triggering new IRCA
violations. ' 129
Ultimately, Justice Rehnquist stated that the NLRB's lack of
authority to award Castro backpay did not preclude it from imposing
other significant sanctions against the employer for terminating Castro
in violation of the NLRA. 130 For example, the NLRB had already
imposed orders that Hoffman cease and desist from its NLRA
violations and post a notice detailing employees' rights and its
previously unfair practices.'31 Finally, he stated that the NLRB has no
authority to impose punitive sanctions on an employer. 132
122. Id. at 148-49.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 143-44.
125. Id. at 150.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 150-51.
129. Id. at 151. For an interesting discussion of the importance of "mitigating damages" to
the Hoffman decision, see Schnapper, supra note 19, at 46.
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3. The Dissent
For the dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg) responded that backpay awards like the one in
Hoffman are not inconsistent with the policies underlying IRCA; on
the contrary, they are necessary to sufficiently deter employers from
violating the labor laws.' 33 Instead of finding a conflict between the
laws, he framed the NLRA and IRCA as having a symbiotic
relationship-that providing backpay to undocumented immigrants"reasonably helps to deter unlawful activity that both labor laws and
immigration laws seek to prevent." '134 Furthermore, Justice Breyer
asserted that immigration laws do not explicitly state how immigration
violations are to affect the enforcement of other laws, such as the labor
laws. 3 ' In fact, he reported that those in Congress who wrote the
immigration laws stated explicitly and unequivocally that IRCA does
not take from the NLRB any of its authority to remedy unfair
practices committed against undocumented employees.'36 Moreover,
he asserted that the availability of backpay awards to undocumented
workers would not likely influence an individual's decision to migrate
illegally to the United States.13 7
Notably, Justice Breyer posited that the purpose of the NLRA
involves more than just victim compensation; in fact, remedies such as
the backpay award serve as essential deterrents to employers.'38
Specifically, he asserted that "[w]ithout the possibility of the
deterrence that backpay provides, the NLRB can impose only future-
oriented obligations upon law-violating employers-for it has no other
weapons in its remedial arsenal."' 39 As such, "in the absence of the
backpay weapon, employers could conclude that they can violate the
labor laws at least once with impunity."' 40 Furthermore, he stated that
the backpay award provides an important incentive to the employee to
report illegal employer conduct.'
Justice Breyer also disagreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist's
interpretation and use of precedent. In particular, he distinguished
the facts in Fansteel and Southern S.S. Co. from the facts in Hoffman,
133. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153. However, there is also a view that the immigration laws
and the labor laws are incompatible as written. See, e.g., Hudson & Schenk, supra note 15, at 362
(offering an interesting proposal for legislative solutions to this incompatibility).
134. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153 (emphasis in original)
135. Id. at 154-55.
136. Id. at 157 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 58 (1986)).
137. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 157.
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stating that in the former two cases, the employees had "responded" to
their employer's labor law violations with unlawful acts of their
own. 142 Thus, in both cases, the Court held that the employees' own
unlawful conduct provided the employer with good cause for
discharge, severing any connection to the earlier unfair labor practice
that might otherwise have justified reinstatement and backpay."' In
contrast, the discharge in Hoffman was itself the unfair labor practice,
and the backpay remedy was not precluded by some subsequent act of
Castro's.144
Finally, Justice Breyer stated that Justice Rehnquist's decision
undermined the public policies that underlie U.S. labor laws. 4 ' In
particular, he criticized the Chief Justice's summary of the "negative
features" involved in awarding backpay and reinstatement to
undocumented immigrants: (1) for years of work not performed; (2)
for wages that could not lawfully have been earned; and (3) for a job
obtained in the first instance by a criminal fraud.'46 Justice Breyer
explained that the backpay award simply requires an employer to pay
an employee whom the employer believed could lawfully have worked
in the United States: (1) for years of work that he would have
performed; (2) for a portion of the wages that he would have earned;
and (3) for a job that the employee would have held had that employer
not unlawfully dismissed the employee for union organizing. 47 In
other words, awarding backpay should never have brought up the
issue of a conflict in the laws because the immigration laws were never
implicated.
4. The Majority Opinion and Dissent Distinguished
Overall, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Breyer agreed that
achieving the stated purpose of IRCA is desirable. However, their
opinions depart most sharply over whether IRCA and remedies under
the NLRA are compatible or in conflict. In particular, they disagreed
over whether an act which would be criminal under another federal
law, in this case IRCA, should bar one from eligibility for backpay
under the NLRA. According to Justice Breyer, precedent only bars
backpay to employees who commit criminal acts in response to an
142. Id. at 158-59.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 159.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 160.
147. Id.
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employer's labor law violations.148 Other employees, particularly
those who may be working illegally, have not been barred from such
recovery. 49 In fact, the Court has even condoned the NLRB's award
of remedies to employees who have committed serious illegal acts such
as perjury.'
In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist framed the granting of
backpay to an undocumented immigrant under the NLRA as a
violation of IRCA itself.'5 ' And ultimately, he predicted that allowing
the grant of backpay to undocumented immigrants would increase
illegal immigration and employment of illegal immigrants, which
would undermine the purpose of IRCA.5 2
The next Part shows how agencies and courts appear to be
combating the confusion and opportunism Hoffman generated by
adopting Justice Breyer's arguments, limiting Hoffman to its facts,
identifying laws the holding did not touch, and articulating that
federal immigration policy is served by enforcement of the labor and
employment laws.
III. MITIGATING THE CONFUSION AND OPPORTUNISM THAT
PRECIPITATED FROM HOFFMAN"3
Hoffman is confusing and misleading, which has encouraged
opportunistic employer defendants to exploit the opinion to limit their
liability for remedies under any labor or employment laws in general,
not just the NLRA. Specifically, Justice Rehnquist's statement that"awarding backpay to illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying
IRCA" has already been construed broadly by lawyers and their
employer defendant clients.' 4  Some employer defendants have
already begun to argue that undocumented workers have "no labor
rights" at all.55  As a result, undocumented workers are being
148. Id. at 158-59
149. Id. at 157.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 151.
152. Id.
153. See generally Smith et al., supra note 24, at 16-20 (discussing practice methods to
protect undocumented immigrant clients from "intrusive discovery," such as interview
questions, informal discussions with opposing counsel, formal discovery protections, and
motions in limine).
154. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149; see infra Section III.B (discussing how courts are limiting
Hoffman).
155. See National Employment Law Project, Inc., Employers' and Their Lawyers' Attempts
to Expand U.S. Supreme Court Ruling in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, (Sept. 18,
2002), available at http://www.nelp.org; Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Supreme Court Strikes Down
NLRB's Back Pay Award to Illegal Aliens, available at
http://www.kilstock.com/site/print/detail?Articleld= 1053 (last visited July 23, 2003); see also
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dissuaded from bringing labor law claims for fear of exposure of their
immigration status, and ultimately, exposure to immigration
authorities." 6  This reluctance to litigate claims will make
undocumented workers more attractive to employers (as explained
infra in Part IV).
Importantly, the Hoffman opinion is confusing because Justice
Rehnquist never expressly limited or attempted to clarify its reach.
For instance, he never explicitly distinguished NLRA backpay cases
from other types of employment law cases in which undocumented
workers may be eligible for labor and employment law remedies.'57 In
addition, the general nature of the discussion suggests that the case is
merely a harbinger for future cases in which any foreigner who has"never been legally authorized to work in the United States" is
precluded by federal immigration policy from receiving any labor and
employment law remedies. 5 ' By focusing much of the analysis on the
illegality of the underlying employment relationships between
undocumented workers and employers, Justice Rehnquist implicitly
described relationships that give rise to all kinds of labor and
employment law claims, not just NLRA claims."5 9
To date, the NLRB,'60 the DOL 61 the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC),162 and state and federal courts1 63
Smith & Blanco, supra note 15, at 894. To illustrate, as Smith and Blanco point out in their
article, a website for one of the United State's fifty largest law firms advises its employer clients
to familiarize themselves with the holding in Hoffman for the purpose of saving money when
defending claims for lost wages and benefits against undocumented immigrants. The website
advises as follows:
[T]he principles of the Hoffman decision are likely to be applied to remedies for
violations of other laws as well. Thus, the potential financial exposure of employers
for such claims as employment discrimination and wrongful discharge may be
substantially reduced when the claimant is found to be an illegal alien who falsified
identification documents to obtain employment. Employers should remain alert to
this possibility when defending claims for lost wages and benefits.
Id.
156. See Smith & Blanco, supra note 15, at 893.
157. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 145.
158. Id. at 140.
159. Seeid. at 149.
160. NLRB Discusses Impact of Hoffman Plastic on Procedures and Remedies for
Undocumented Workers, IMMIGR. BUS. NEWS & COMMENT, 2002 WL 31398685 (Nov. 1,
2002).
161. Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Fact Sheet No. 48: Application of U.S.
Labor Laws to Immigrant Workers: Effect of Hoffman Plastics Decision on Laws Enforced by the
Wage and Hour Division, available at
[http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/whd/whdfs48.htm (last visited July 24, 2003)
hereinafter DOL, Fact Sheet No. 48].
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have largely chosen to limit Hoffman to its facts, clarifying its scope in
several ways, including the extent to which it should apply in cases
involving backpay.'64 Nevertheless, many employer defendants have
attempted to use Hoffman to their benefit in cases concerning various
employment laws and fact patterns analogous to Hoffman. 16s In
addition, a few members of state courts have adopted the general
language of Hoffman and have even stretched its rationale in order to
exclude undocumented immigrants from recovery in workers
compensation cases. 66
A. Agencies Are Clarifying Hoffman's Scope
Soon after the July 2002 Hoffman decision, the NLRB's Office of
General Counsel issued a memorandum intended to guide its
administrators on the appropriate procedures and remedies concerning
immigrant employees. 16' The memo explains that despite the
Hoffman decision, undocumented immigrants are still considered"employees" under the NLRA. 168 An individual's work authorization
status is irrelevant to an employer's liability under the NLRA, and
questions concerning immigration status should be left for the
compliance stage of a case.'69 In addition, conditional reinstatement
remains an appropriate remedy as long as an undocumented alien
achieves legal status before reinstatement. 17' The memo states that
because of Hoffman, backpay is no longer a suitable remedy for the
discharge of individuals for the period of time they were legally
unavailable to work in the United States. 171 Consequently, the NLRB
states that it will not seek a backpay remedy once evidence establishes
162. Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission,
Directives Transmittal No. 915.002, June 27, 2002, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/undoc-rescind.html [hereinafter EEOC, D.T. No. 915.002].
163. See infra Section III.B.
164. See Smith & Blanco, supra note 15, at 890. Smith and Blanco note that some courts
have "substantially limited labor rights post-Hoffman." Id. While this may be true, I have
found that most lower courts are attempting to control the effect of Hoffman. If anything, lower
courts have shown a commitment to the labor and employment laws and have sought to keep as
separate endeavors the enforcement of those laws and the enforcement of the immigration laws.
165. See Hudson & Schenk, supra note 15, at 891.
166. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy, Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003);
Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers Comp. Appeal Board., 810 A.2d 99, 102 (Pa. 2002).
167. Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, Memorandum GC 02-06, Procedures and
Remedies for Discriminatees Who May Be Undocumented Aliens After Hoffman Plastic
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that a worker was not, in fact, authorized to work during the period for
which backpay is sought.172
In addition, the NLRB memo clarifies that Hoffman did not
prohibit compensation for undocumented workers for work previously
performed under unlawfully imposed terms and conditions.173  The
memo also states that backpay for an employee who has been
unlawfully demoted into a lower paying position presents an open
question, and requests that those cases be referred to the central office
for advice. 174 The memo also states that Hoffman had no effect on
other sanctions that may be imposed under current law. 7 ' Finally,
with respect to investigative procedures, the memo adds that Hoffman
does not shift the burden to the NLRB to conduct an immigration
investigation in the first instance. 176
Similarly, other federal agencies have sought to clearly define
Hoffman's scope and limit the holding to its facts. For example, the
EEOC issued a directive informing the public of its decision to rescind
its previous enforcement guidance on remedies available to
undocumented workers under federal employment discrimination
laws.177 In the directive, the EEOC stated that because of Hoffman,
undocumented workers are not entitled to backpay or reinstatement. 178
However, it reaffirmed that Hoffman does not call into question the
principle that federal employment discrimination statutes cover
undocumented workers. 179 Furthermore, it stated that the EEOC will
not, on its own initiative, inquire into a worker's immigration status
when enforcing discrimination laws. 8 ° It also affirmed that the EEOC
will not consider an individual's immigration status when examining
the underlying merits of a charge, 1' and it promised that the EEOC
would continue to vigorously pursue charges filed by any worker
covered by the federal employment discrimination laws, including
charges brought by undocumented workers.'82 Nevertheless, the
EEOC stated that it would seek appropriate remedies in light of
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filed by any worker covered by the federal employment discrimination
laws., 183
Likewise, the DOL issued a fact sheet explaining the effect the
Hoffman decision had on laws enforced by its Wage and Hour
Division.184 The fact sheet explicitly states that the DOL's Wage and
Hour Division "will continue to enforce the FLSA... without regard
to whether an employee is documented or undocumented.""18 It also
distinguishes the NLRA from the FLSA by explaining that in
Hoffman, the Court refused to award backpay "for years of work not
performed, for wages that could not lawfully have been earned."186 In
contrast, under the FLSA, the Department generally "seeks back pay
for hours an employee has actually worked, under laws that require
payment for such work. "'87
And the agencies are not alone in their fight to limit Hoffman.
Most opinions from state and federal courts have shown a concerted
effort among judges and justices to identify circumstances and laws
unaffected by Hoffman and to clarify Hoffman's scope in general. The
next Section summarizes these efforts and, in addition, discusses a case
in which Hoffman was misapplied.
B. Courts Are Limiting Hoffman
The sheer volume of cases that Hoffman spawned is an indication
that the opinion has confused and misled many litigants.'88 However,
similar to the agencies discussed above, courts appear to be
performing damage control, limiting Hoffman to its facts and
identifying laws and remedies that should remain unaffected by the
decision. In general, although they do not cite Justice Breyer, these
courts are constructing a body of case law reminiscent of his dissent.'89
In particular, like Justice Breyer, courts have emphasized that
awarding employment remedies to undocumented workers helps to
achieve the purpose of IRCA. The courts emphasize that the
employment laws, if applied to undocumented as well as legal workers,
help to deter employers from exploiting the illegal workforce. From
these cases, the following premises have begun to emerge and
183. Id.




188. Whether those litigants are opportunist or simply misled employers, or whether they
are misinformed employees, the number of cases where persons are battling over backpay
suggests that something is awry.
189. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153-60.
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develop:19 ° (1) Hoffman did not affect unpaid wages claims for work
already performed;' 9 ' (2) the release of immigration documents in
minimum wage and overtime cases will have an in terrorem effect;' 92
(3) requiring employers to pay proper wages to undocumented
immigrants for work performed furthers the goals and policies behind
IRCA; 9 3 (4) Hoffman does not bar injunctive and declaratory relief or
compensatory and punitive damages in retaliation cases under the
FLSA;' 94 (5) immigration status is not relevant to stating a claim for a
violation of the ADA;' (6) immigration status outside the discreet
backpay period is not relevant;' 96 and (7) IRCA does not foreclose the
grant of workers compensation benefits to undocumented immigrants
if they have satisfied all of the eligibility requirements for workers
compensation as detailed in state workers compensation statutes.1)9 7
This Section discusses the decisions that generated these
premises as well as two opinions in which a court, or one member of a
court, improperly extended Hoffman.'98 Some of these opinions are
unpublished, and many jurisdictions have yet to voice their
interpretations of Hoffman; however, they indicate some consensus
and trends on important distinctions between the facts of Hoffman and
cases in which Hoffman should not apply.
1. Immigration Status Is Irrelevant to Unpaid Wages Claims
Several jurisdictions have held that immigration status is not
relevant to an unpaid wage claim for work already performed.'99 For
example, in Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., eight janitors sued their
employers for unpaid overtime premiums and other wages to which
they were entitled under the FLSA. °°  In turn, the employer
190. For a comprehensive practitioner's summary of the labor and employment law
remedies that survived Hoffman, see Smith et al., supra note 24, at 8-16, which discusses pre-
and post-Hoffman remedies as well as some employment laws not discussed in this Note, such as
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970), and the Migrant
and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1994).
191. Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., No. CV0100515AHM(SHX), 2002 WL 1163623 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 9, 2002).
192. Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
193. Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
194. Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R's Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
195. Lopez v. Superflex, Ltd., No. 01 CIV.10010 (NRB), 2002 WL 1941484 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 21, 2002).
196. De La Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237 (C.D. Il. 2002).
197. Reinforced Earth, 810 A.2d at 102.
198. See Sanchez, 658 N.W.2d at 510.
199. See, e.g., Albertsons, 2002 WL 1163623; Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping, Inc., No.
00 C 6320, 2002 WL 31175471 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2002); Singh, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
200. Albertsons, 2002 WL 1163623, at *1.
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defendants submitted a discovery request for documents related to theplaintiffs' immigration status.20 1 The defendants claimed that the
plaintiffs' immigration documents were relevant because, under
Hoffman, employer liability for backpay is limited as to undocumented
immigrants. °2 However, the district court found that Hoffman did
not concern unpaid wages for work already performed. 3 The court
also took the opportunity to clarify Hoffman's reach by stating boldly
that "[f]ederal courts are clear that the protections of the FLSA are
available to citizens and undocumented workers alike. , 204
Consequently, the court denied the defendant's motion.205
Similarly, in Cortez v. Medina,2°6 employer defendants invoked
Hoffman in an attempt to compel the immigration documents of an
employee plaintiff who sued under the FLSA for overtime wages. 207
In Cortez, the district court clearly distinguished Hoffman from cases
in which a plaintiff seeks unpaid wages under the FLSA,2 °8 stating that
"[c]ritical to the Court's holding [in Hoffman] was the fact that the
work had not been performed and that it would have been illegal for
the plaintiffs to mitigate damages, which is required for a backpay
award. ' 29 In contrast, the court found no conflict of laws in awarding
backpay to Cortez, who would not be expected to mitigate damages
for unpaid wages. Ultimately, the court denied the defendant's
motion to compel finding that Hoffman does not bar undocumented
immigrants from receiving backpay, 210 which suggests that the court
found immigration status irrelevant to unpaid wages cases.
201. Id. at*2.
202. Id. at *5.
203. Id.
204. Id. (citing Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 706 (1lth Cir. 1988)).
205. Id.
206. Cortez, 2002 WL 31175471, at *1.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. In Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), the court made
the same distinction, noting that in Hoffman, Castro was terminated from employment, could
not be legally reinstated, and could not legally obtain other work through mitigation because he
was not lawfully permitted to be in the United States. The court in Amigon articulated that there
was no such impediment to awarding repayment for work the plaintiff already performed. Id.
210. See Cortez, 2002 WL 31175471, at *1. Notably, during oral argument in Hoffman,
the Supreme Court indicated that it already perceived a distinction between backpay for work
already performed and backpay for work not performed (such as backpay after wrongful
termination under the NLRA). Transcript of Oral Argument , Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (2002)
(No. 00-1595), 2002 WL 77224, at *14 (Jan. 15, 2002). If this point had been made clear in the
Hoffman decision itself, immigration status would not have been at issue in Cortez or Albertsons.
It is likely that Cortez and Albertsons, and other unpaid wage cases (such as Singh, 214 F. Supp.
2d 1056 (2002), and Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462 (2002)) would survive review at the Supreme
Court on the issue of backpay. Note the following excerpt from the oral argument in Hoffman:
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2. Discovery of Immigration Status in FLSA Wage Cases Has an In
Terrorem Effect
In other cases, courts have not only stressed that Hoffman cannot
justify discovery of immigration documents in minimum wage and
overtime cases under the FLSA, but that allowing for such discovery
would have an in terrorem effect that would be more harmful than
relevant.21 1 In general, these courts have included detailed policy
discussions in their rationales, weaving well-articulated arguments in
favor of preserving unpaid wage claims for undocumented immigrants
and adopting language reminiscent of Justice Breyer's dissent.1 2
For example, in one such case, Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan
International, Inc., the court suggested that evidence of immigration
status was more harmful than relevant.213 Notably, the court reasoned
that even if the parties were to enter into a confidentiality agreement
restricting discovery of the plaintiffs' immigration documents, there
would still remain "the danger of intimidation, [and] the danger of
destroying the cause of action" which would inhibit the plaintiffs in
pursuing their rights under the FLSA 14 In a similar case, Flores v.
Amigon, when employer defendants sought to use Hoffman to
compel immigration documents, 16 the court stressed that Hoffman did
QUESTION [the Court]: May I ask if your position would apply if this were a
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act instead of the labor act? If the employer
had underpaid the employee, would he have a right to back pay?
MR. McCORTNEY [counsel for the Government]: Your Honor, I-in the amicus
brief of the States they seem to equate back pay under the NLRA with back pay
under the FLSA when they're two different things. Back pay-
QUESTION: I understand they're two different-I just want to know what your
position is on that.
MR. McCORTNEY: No, we would not advocate at all, and we have not, taking
wages away from undocumented aliens that have been earned for work already
performed.
Transcript of Oral Argument at *14. Robert H. Gibbs drew my attention to the fact that the
Court made this distinction at the oral arguments and yet omitted it from the opinion. I posit
that this omission is what generated much of the resulting confusion in the wake of Hoffman. E-
mail from Robert H. Gibbs, Partner, Gibbs Houston Pauw, to Elizabeth R. Baldwin, law
student, Seattle University School of Law (May 2, 2003, 16:31:25 PST) (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review).
211. See, e.g., Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462.
212. See, e.g., Donna Karan, 207 F. Supp. at 193; Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
213. Donna Karan, 207 F. Supp, 2d at 193 (stating that "if it appears at some later juncture
that such discovery would be relevant, and more relevant than harmful, Donna Karan may seek
leave to renew this request").
214. Id. (quoting Ansoumana v. Gristide's Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)).
215. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
216. See id.
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not limit employer liability in FLSA cases and that the potential
prejudice and in terrorem effect from production of immigration
documents far outweighed whatever minimal value discovery of
immigration documents might have.217
3. Requiring Employers to Comply with Wage Standards Under the
FLSA Furthers the Goal of IRCA
The Amigon court also articulated that "requiring employers to
pay proper wages to undocumented immigrants when the work has
been performed actually furthers the goal of the IRCA. '21 8 The court
reasoned that if employers were threatened by civil penalties21 and
criminal prosecution 221 when they hire undocumented workers, and
they were also required to pay those workers at the same rate as legal
workers, incentive for hiring undocumented immigrants will be
eliminated. 22' Thus, the court asserted, the "FLSA's coverage of
undocumented immigrants goes hand in hand with the policies behind
the IRCA." 222 In addition, the court stated that the legislative history
of IRCA suggests that Congress believed undocumented immigrants
should be protected by the FLSA for this very reason and that
allowing employers to circumvent the labor laws as to undocumented
immigrants condones the exploitation and underpay of those
workers.223
4. Hoffman Does Not Bar Injunctive and Declaratory Relief or
Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Retaliation Cases Under the
FLSA
In Singh v. C.D. & R's Oil, Inc., the district court held that
Hoffman does not bar injunctive and declaratory relief, or
compensatory and punitive damages, in retaliation cases under the
FLSA.224 In that case, an undocumented worker sued his employer,
alleging that the employer violated the FLSA when he reported the
worker to the INS with retaliatory intent a day after the worker and
employer settled the worker's wage claim. 225  Subsequently, the
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A).
220. Id. § 1324a(f)(1).
221. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
222. Id. (quoting Patel, 846 F.2d at 704).
223. Id. (quoting Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053,
1056 (N.D. Cal. 1998)).
224. Singh, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.
225. Seeid. at 1057.
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employer made a motion to dismiss asserting that the plaintiffs action
was barred under Hoffman. 26 According to the defendant's motion,
Hoffman limits employer liability to undocumented immigrants under
any federal labor law. 227 The court denied the defendant's motion,
asserting that "[a]llowing an undocumented worker to bring an anti-
retaliation claim under the FLSA is consistent with the immigration
policies underlying IRCA." 22' Like the Amigon court, the Singh court
stated that if FLSA's minimum wage provisions did not apply to
undocumented workers, employers would have an economic incentive
to hire undocumented workers because many employers would choose
the risk of liability under IRCA in exchange for saving money on
wages. 229
5. Immigration Status Is Not Relevant to Stating a Claim Under the
ADA
Case law also suggests that immigration status is not relevant to
stating a claim for a violation of the ADA. 23" For example, in Lopez v.
Superflex, an employee who worked for a year in Superflex's hose
factory was diagnosed with kidney failure. 3' Consequently, he
required ten days leave from work for surgery and recovery.3 2 After
he was released from the hospital and was ready to return to work,
Superflex fired him without a determination as to whether or not he
could perform the duties of his old job or any other job at the
231company. ' Subsequently, Lopez filed a complaint against the
employer alleging that his termination violated the ADA.234 In turn,
the employer defendant brought a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim because Lopez would not produce documents to show he was
legally employed.235
In its motion, Superflex argued that, in light of Hoffman, a
plaintiff must prove that he or she is legally employed in order to be
entitled to "federal relief." However, the court held that even if an
illegal alien were precluded from seeking compensatory and punitive
damages for alleged violations of the ADA, a former employee would
not be required to plead that he or she was legally working in the
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1060.
228. Id. at 1062.
229. Id.
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United States in order to state a claim that an employer's termination
of that employee violated the ADA. 236 Furthermore, the court held
that an award of backpay or reinstatement, which could potentially
invoke the holding in Hoffman, is not a prerequisite for a punitive
damages award under the ADA.237
6. Immigration Documents Are Only Relevant to the Discreet
Backpay Period
Immigration documents have been found to be only relevant to
the discreet period for which backpay is sought. For example, in De
La Rosa v. Northern Harvest Furniture, the district court held that
immigration status outside the backpay period is not relevant to a
claim for backpay.2 38  Former employees filed suit against their
employers alleging violations of Title VII, the FLSA, and the Illinois
Minimum Wage Law,239 seeking post-termination backpay from the
date that the employees were terminated to the date that the
defendants offered to reinstate the plaintiffs in their jobs. 4' The
employer defendants filed a motion to compel immigration documents
from the employees to prove their immigration status during their
previous employment with the defendant and to confirm their current
immigration status.24 They based their request on the premise that
the holding in Hoffman made immigration documents relevant to
claims for backpay.242 However, the court held that the only period
for which the plaintiffs sought backpay would be relevant. 243
Ultimately, the court in Lopez denied the defendant's motion because
the documents they tried to compel fell outside the actual period of
backpay sought by the plaintiffs. 244
7. IRCA Does Not Affect Workers Compensation Benefits when
236. Id. at *1 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)).
237. Id. at *2. Notably, the court chose not to address the issue of standing, stating only
that "[i]f Hoffman Plastics does deny undocumented [immigrant] workers the relief sought by
plaintiff, then [the plaintiff] would lack standing." Lopez, 2002 WL 1941484, at *2. However,
because the issue of standing was not ripe for decision, the court refrained from making this
determination and did not answer whether an undocumented worker has standing to sue under
the ADA. Id.
238. De La Rosa, 210 F.R.D. at 239.
239. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/1-15 (1999).
240. See De La Rosa, 210 F.R.D. at 237.
241. Id. at 237-38.
242. Id. at 238.
243. Id. at 239.
244. Id.
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Undocumented Workers Meet the Requisite Standards 245
State courts have already grappled with issue of whether IRCA
affects undocumented immigrants' eligibility for workers
compensation benefits. While some courts have held that Hoffman
will not affect the eligibility of a person who otherwise meets the
requisite standards, other courts have not been unanimous on this
point. For example, in Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers Compensation
Appeal Board,246 a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed the Workers Compensation Appeals Board's order to grant
an undocumented worker total disability and all reasonable and
necessary medical expenses associated with his on-the-job injury. 247
Despite the employer defendant's representations to the contrary, the
court reasoned that IRCA does not foreclose the grant of workers
compensation benefits to unauthorized workers if workers have
satisfied all of the eligibility requirements for workers compensation as
detailed in the workers compensation statute.248
In addition, the court distinguished Reinforced Earth from Graves
v. Workers Compensation Appeal Board,249 in which the court held that
an escaped prisoner could not receive backpay.5 ° Importantly, the
court in Graves expressly limited its holding to the "proposition that
an escape from official detention renders a claimant ineligible for
benefits" under the workers compensation law. 251  The court in
Reinforced Earth explicitly emphasized that "we specifically limited
the Graves holding to escaped convicted criminals only, not illegal
aliens who upon detection would normally be deported from the
United States. "252
However, the dissent in Reinforced Earth maintained that the
policy of affording workers compensation benefits to employees
injured in work-related accidents should yield to the injunction of
Congressional policy against the employment of undocumented
immigrants as expressed in IRCA and as illustrated by the Court in
Hoffman.5 3 Specifically, the dissent claimed that Hoffman teaches,"where two legislative schemes apply to the same situation, one may
245. For a discussion contrasting state law before and after Hoffman, see Smith et al., supra
note 24, at 14-16.
246. Reinforced Earth Co. v. W.C.A.B. (Astudillo), 570 Pa. 464, 810 A.2d 99 (2002).
247. Id. at 107.
248. Id.
249. 668 A.2d 606 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1995)
250. Reinforced Earth, 810 A.2d at 102.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 103.
253. Id. at 110-11.
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have to yield to the higher policy interests served by the other," and
that in Hoffman, the court held that labor policy must yield to
immigration policy.2"4  Furthermore, the dissent stated that an
unauthorized alien, by operation of IRCA, has no legal earning
power."' Accordingly, it reasoned that the Pennsylvania General
Assembly could not have intended the "absurd result" of supplying
social welfare benefits in the form of a wage and employment-benefit
substitute "to one whom federal law says could not lawfully obtain
those wages and benefits in the first place" and for work that arose out
of an illegal employment relationship." 6
Similar to the dissent in Reinforced Earth, in Sanchez v. Eagle
Alloy Inc.,257 the Michigan Court of Appeals applied Hoffman to
reverse a Workers Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC)
decision that granted weekly wage loss benefits under the Workers
Disability Compensation Act (WDCA) to an undocumented worker
beyond the date on which his illegal employment status was
discovered." 8 In its rationale, the court first looked to the language of
the WDCA, which absolves employers of liability for such periods of
time as the employee is "unable to work because of a commission of a
crime. ' 259 The court decided that this language precluded an
undocumented immigrant worker from recovering weekly wage loss
benefits beyond the date in which his employment status was
discovered because, according to Hoffman, document fraud is a crime
under IRCA. 26" Furthermore, the court reasoned that, according to
Hoffman, an employer could not legally retain an undocumented
immigrant as an employee or help him find other work.26 1
From analysis of the foregoing state and federal cases, it is clear
that Hoffman has tempted and misled many employer defendants to
fight liability in cases that fall well outside of the strict holding of
Hoffman. Typically, these defendants argue that undocumented
immigrants, from a policy standpoint, should not recover remedies or
benefits under any of the labor and employment laws because of their
illegal status under IRCA. Nevertheless, with a few exceptions, courts
have sought to clarify the scope of Hoffman, limiting it to its facts and
identifying areas of the law that were unaffected by the opinion.
254. Id. at 110.
255. Id. at 111.
256. Id.
257. 658 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
258. Id. at 521.
259. Id. at 519.
260. Id. at 520.
261. Seeid. at S21.
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Limiting the opinion in this way will be essential to preserving the
integrity of IRCA. To buttress the argument that courts must
continue to limit Hoffman, the next Part addresses the weaknesses in
the Hoffman opinion itself.
IV. HOFFMAN SHOULD BE LIMITED TO ITS FACTS262
Hoffman must be limited to its facts because it departs from
IRCA's statutory language and it undermines Congress's intent.263
Furthermore, the opinion has the unwelcome feel of judicial
activism, 264  effectively creating a new way to initiate IRCA
investigations that will trigger its enforcement mechanisms in ways
Congress never intended. Moreover, Hoffman fails to achieve its own
stated purpose by condoning violations of IRCA and the labor and
employment laws. In light of these criticisms, the case must be
overturned by the Supreme Court or its effects ameliorated by
Congressional action. 265
A. Departing from the Text of IRCA and the Intent of Congress
Where Congress passes an act, "the particular language of the
text is always the starting point on any question concerning the
application of the law. "266 As a general rule of statutory
construction, when a statute is clear on its face (i.e. when well-
262. See also Thomas J. Walsh, Note, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: How
the Supreme Court Eroded Labor Law and Workers Rights in the Name of Immigration Policy, 21
LAW & INEQ. 313 (2003) (critiquing Justice Rehnquist's use of case precedent in Hoffman).
263. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a; H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8-9 (1986).
264. "A philosophy of judicial decision-making whereby judges allow their personal views
about public policy, among other factors, to guide their decisions, usu[ally] with the suggestion
that adherents of this philosophy tend to find constitutional violations and are willing to ignore
precedent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 850 (7th ed. 1999).
265. It should be noted that the Court has shown its willingness to overturn its own
decisions, as demonstrated by the recent 5-4 vote in Lawrence v, Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
This decision overturned the controversial decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
and held that all sodomy laws in the United States are unconstitutional and unenforceable when
applied to consenting adults in private.
266. NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:01, at 1
(6th ed. 2000) [hereinafter STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION]; cf. Owasso Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 1-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 434 (2002) ("It is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their
place in the overall statutory scheme."); see also Smith v. Doe, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 1147 (2003)
("Whether a statutory scheme is civil or criminal 'is first of all a question of statutory
construction.' ... We consider the statute's text and its structure to determine the legislative
objective."); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 123 S.Ct. 518, 526 (2002) (Regarding interpretation
of a pre-emption clause, the court stated, "our 'task of statutory construction must in the first
instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of
Congress' pre-emptive intent."').
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informed persons cannot reasonably disagree about the meaning of the
text) the text need not be interpreted beyond its plain meaning. 21 7
Nevertheless, when Congress has drafted an ambiguous statute, our
system of separation of powers mandates that courts interpret what the
law says. 26" However, it is commonly understood that as part of this
mandate, courts have an "obligation to construe statutes so that they
carry out the will, real or attributed, of the law-making branch of the
government. '' 269 For instance, Lord Blackburn, who is often cited for
his portrayal of the task of interpretation, has stated the following:
In all cases the object is to see what is the intention expressed by
the words used. But, from the imperfection of language, it is
impossible to know what that intention is without inquiring
further, and seeing what the circumstances were with reference
to which the words were used, and what was the object,
appearing from those circumstances, which the person using
them had in view; for the meaning of the word varies according
to the circumstances with respect to which they were used.27
In essence, canons of statutory construction suggest that courts
should interpret an ambiguous statute by contextualizing it, 2 1
reviewing the policy and legislative scheme behind it, researching the
legislative history, and employing "concepts of reasonableness along
with the language of the statute in order to determine the legislative
intent. 272
Justice Rehnquist purported to craft the Hoffman decision for the
purpose of preserving Congressional intent; yet his opinion relies on
assumptions that are absent from the texts of IRCA and the NLRA
and that run contrary to stated immigration and employment policies
and the legislative history of IRCA. Nowhere in IRCA's statutory
267. STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 266, § 45:02, at 11 (citing
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
268. STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 266, § 45:03, at 19-21; see
also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (holding that it is "the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is").
269. STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 266, § 45:05, at 25.
270. Id. (citing River Wear Comm'rs v. Adamson, LR 2 AC 743 (1877)).
271. But see JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES § 2.2, at 225 (1997) (explaining that "canons of statutory interpretation are often
contradictory; there is almost always a canon to which each side in the dispute can appeal.").
Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to maintain that the interpretation of a statute should
both depart from the text of the statute, as well as the intent of Congress, unless the interpreter
were saving the greater society from a dangerous and destructive result.
272. STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 266, § 45:03, at 21 (citing
No Illegal Points, Citizens for Drivers Rights, Inc. v. Florio, 264 N.J. Super. 318, 624 A.2d 981
(App. Div. 1993).
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language are undocumented immigrants expressly precluded from
protections or remedies under the labor and employment laws,
especially not from the NLRA 3  In fact, despite what Justice
Rehnquist implies in Hoffman, IRCA simply does not say that
employers cannot pay employees for work not performed.274 Rather,
IRCA explicitly sanctions unauthorized employment and the
presentation of false documents; but it does not explicitly penalize
payment of money from a citizen or documented immigrant to an
undocumented immigrant.7 Nowhere in the NLRA does the
statutory language indicate that finding a plaintiff to be an
undocumented immigrant constitutes a defense to employer
liability. 76 Moreover, the NLRA explicitly protects "any employee,"
not merely "legal employees. 277
And the legislative history of IRCA suggests that Justice
Rehnquist, and those who joined him, arrived at a result never
contemplated by Congress. When IRCA was conceived, the House
Judiciary Committee Report on H.R. 6514 (or the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1982) explained that the Act was needed
to help "secure our borders" and to "protect our own workers from
adverse competition in the labor market. ' 27" However, Congress
expressly designed IRCA to achieve this goal by focusing on employer
behavior and making undocumented immigrants less attractive as
employees. 279 As a result of various studies, Congress had a developed
understanding of employment dynamics and undocumented
273. See Pub. L. No. 99-603 (1986).
274. Gibbs, supra note 210.
275. Id.
276. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2001).
277. Id. § 152(3). The NLRA defines "employee" in the following manner:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise,
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but
shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by
his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor,
or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., as amended from
time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
Id.
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immigrant worker habits that led to this approach. 28" Exhibiting this
understanding as far back as 1973, the House Judiciary's immigration
subcommittee stated that "the U.S. employer, unlike the illegal alien,
is amenable to deterrence' vis a vis' economic and criminal
sanctions. ' 281  In other words, Congress knew long before it passed
IRCA that it would have to focus its attack on employer practices if it
was to have any effect on the employment of undocumented
immigrants.
Moreover, the legislative history for IRCA suggests that
Congress intended undocumented immigrants to be eligible for
remedies under the labor laws, including the NLRA, for the purpose
of furthering the goals of IRCA.282 For example, Congress explicitly
funded the DOL's Wage and Hour Division so it could enforce labor
laws, such as the FLSA, on behalf of undocumented workers.283 As
the language of IRCA reads, this funding was meant to enable
undocumented immigrants to bring labor claims; the hope was that
their ability to bring claims would deter employers from hiring
them.284 Thus, the legislative intent of Congress was clear: protect
U.S. jobs for legal workers by making undocumented immigrants
unattractive to employers through imposing economic sanctions on
the employers who hire them.
280. See id. at *12-13 (citing Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., Illegal Aliens: A Review of Hearings Conducted During the 92d Congress (Serial No. 13, pts.
1-5) at 22).
281. Id.
282. Id. at *13-14. To illustrate, the House Education and Labor Committee report
"makes it clear that Congress [upon adopting IRCA] intended the full panoply of the Nation's
labor and employment laws, including the [NLRA], to be enforced on behalf of undocumented
workers." Id. Importantly, the report also stated the following:
[Tjhe committee does not intend that any provision of this Act [IRCA] would limit
the powers of State and Federal labor standards agencies such as ... the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor ... [and] the National Labor Relations
Board... in conformity with existing law, to remedy unfair practices committed
against undocumented employees for exercising their rights before such agencies or
for engaging in activities protected by these agencies. To do otherwise would be
counter-productive of our intent to limit the hiring of undocumented employees and
the depressing effect on working conditions caused by their employment.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8-9 (1986)).
283. Id. at *8 (citing IRCA § 111(d)). This statute states, in part:
There are authorized to be appropriated ... such sums as may be necessary to the
Department of Labor for enforcement activities of the Wage and Hour Division...
in order to deter the employment of unauthorized aliens and remove the economic
incentive for employers to exploit and use such aliens.
See also Brief of National Labor Relations Board et al., 2001 WL 1597748, at *36-37, Hoffman,
535 U.S. 140 (2002) (No. 00-1595).
284. Brief of ACLU, supra note 25, at 8-10.
Damage Control after Hoffman
In contrast, in Hoffman, Justice Rehnquist apparently sought to
protect U.S. jobs by making it impossible for the NLRB to charge
employers backpay after they wrongfully discharge undocumented
workers. This effectively releases employers from their usual
obligation of paying wrongfully terminated employees backpay under
the NLRA. Thus, Hoffman had the crude result of eliminating
economic consequences for employers who terminate undocumented
employees for labor union involvement, which makes it crudely
cheaper for employers to hire undocumented workers than
documented or citizen workers. Ironically, this result does nothing
but make undocumented immigrants more attractive to employers, a
result that constitutes the exact inverse of what Congress intended
when it passed IRCA.
B. Creating a New Way to Investigate IRCA Violations and a New
Defense for Employers
The Hoffman decision did not just depart from the language of
IRCA and the intent of Congress; de facto, the holding created a new
way to investigate employee violations of IRCA and a new defense for
employers. By singling out undocumented immigrants as ineligible
for backpay, the Court necessitated investigation into immigration
status each time an immigrant employee brings a claim for wrongful
termination. Document discovery in these situations could have three
effects: (1) it will limit employer obligations to provide backpay; (2) it
will limit an undocumented employee's eligibility for backpay; and (3)
in some cases, it will precipitate exposure of a person's undocumented
status to immigration authorities, which will likely trigger an
enforcement action under IRCA or other immigration laws.
As a generally accepted legal premise, in each area of law, there is
always a right way to go about investigations (e.g., requirements for
Miranda warnings... and search warrants286 in the criminal context;
general discovery rules in civil litigation;28 7 and employee rights in
investigatory interviews conducted by employers,88 to name just a
few). Discovery of immigration documents in labor and employment
litigation over wrongful termination for labor activities is simply not a
proper way to investigate an IRCA violation.28 9 Indeed, there is no
285. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
286. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
287. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 33, 34, 36, 37, 45.
288. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975).
289. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(1)(A)-(C) (1997); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9 (2003); Big Bear
Supermarket No. 3 v. INS, 913 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1990) (Employer's failure to present
employment verification forms at second INS inspection, after first inspection had resulted in
2003]
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evidence in the statute that Congress intended IRCA investigations
and enforcement against immigrants to precipitate when employers
violate the labor laws. 290 Rather, Congress designed specific
investigatory and enforcement mechanisms for IRCA, and those
mechanisms do not involve immigration document discovery in
employment litigation. 291  In fact, the investigatory and enforcement
mechanisms and regulations for IRCA focus on the conduct of
employers, describing how investigations should proceed,292 how
complaints should be filed,293 and when enforcement should take
place 294 among other clearly defined procedures.29
Despite the plain language of IRCA and the NLRA, and despite
the legislative history, Justice Rehnquist traded judicial restraint for a
legislative-like role in his interpretation of the statute. The upsetting
result of Hoffman typifies why "judicial activism" is so often
criticized.296 Justice Rehnquist clearly preferred his own vision of how
to best achieve the goals of IRCA--despite the fact that the
democratically elected Congress had spent years determining the most
appropriate way to design and focus the Act.297
warning citation, constituted a second violation of IRCA for which the government could assess
administrative penalties under the Act.).
290. Notably, IRCA states the following about the importance of maintaining privacy
during employment verification: "Any personal information utilized by the [employee
verification] system may not be made available to Government agencies, employers, and other
persons except to the extent necessary to verify that an individual is not an unauthorized alien," 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(d)(2)(C) (1997), and "[t]he system must protect the privacy and security of
personal information and identifiers utilized in the system." Id. § 1324a(d)(2)(D). See id. §
1324a(e)(1) (Complaints and Investigations), § 1324a(e)(2) (Authority in Investigations), §
1324a(e)(3) (Hearing); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9 (2003) (Enforcement Procedures).
291. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(d)(2)(C)-(D), 1324a(e)(1)-(3)(1997); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9 (2003).
292. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(b) (2003).
293. See id. § 274a.9(a).
294. See id. § 274a.9(d).
295. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)-(f) (2003).
296. Scholars have noted that the Chief Justice has been highly critical of judicial activism
in the Court. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & Avis Alexandria Jones, The Rehnquist Court's
Activism and the Risk of Injustice, 26 CONN. L. REV. 53, 57 (1993).
Of particular importance, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and
other political conservatives, is the need for judges to defer to decisions made by the
democratically elected officials in the legislative and executive branches of
government. This concern for deference to majoritarianism is intended to combat
"judicial activism" that involves "a judicial decision that substitutes judicial policy for
the policy of the elected branches of government."
Id. at 57-58. For a new compilation of essays concerning the Rehnquist Court's Constitutional
and statutory jurisprudence, see generally THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON
THE RIGHT (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002) [hereinafter THE REHNQUIST COURT].
297. Hoffman does not constitute the first opinion in which the Rehnquist Court has used
its judicial power to alter or extinguish legislative decisions of Congress. See Herman Schwartz,
The States Rights Assault on Federal Authority, in THE REHNQUIST COURT, supra note 296, at
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C. Condoning Employer Violations of IRCA and Labor and Employment
Laws
Other inconsistencies plague the Hoffman opinion. In particular,
the Chief Justice implied that to afford backpay remedies to
undocumented immigrants would force the court to ignore blatant
violations of IRCA 98 This Note does not dispute that it is illegal for
an immigrant to obtain work without authorization under IRCA.
However, unlike the Chief Justice suggests, the Court would not need
to ignore IRCA violations if it were to award backpay to
undocumented immigrants under the NLRA because, as the foregoing
discussion indicates, immigration evidence should not be at issue in
those cases. In fact, the award of backpay and other remedies under
the labor and employment laws should not precipitate an inquiry
about immigration status at all unless immigration status is expressly
at issue (i.e., a person was terminated because of his or her
immigration status and wants to prove that his or her status was legal).
Ironically, Hoffman forces courts to ignore IRCA violations as
well as labor and employment laws. By refusing to make employers
accountable to undocumented immigrants for backpay, the Court
condones employers' exploitation of all undocumented workers. By
condoning these violations, Hoffman has made undocumented workers
more attractive to employers. Specifically, undocumented employees
are being dissuaded from bringing claims for fear of the discovery and
exposure of their immigration status;299 thus, employers will inevitably
155-67, which discusses cases such as National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), among other
decisions in which the Rehnquist court has struck down acts of Congress in the name of states'
rights. See also Smith & Jones, supra note 296, at 55, 57. For example, before the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2266 (2000),
Justice Rehnquist unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Congress to reform the habeas corpus
statutes to limit the number of habeas petitions permitted by prisoners on death row. Smith &
Jones, supra note 290, at 62-64 (1993) (citing Joseph L. Hoffman, The Supreme Court's New
Vision of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 165, 188 n.137); Linda
Greenhouse, Judges Challenge Rehnquist's Role on Death Penalty: An Extraordinary Move, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1989, at Al). When these efforts failed, Justice Rehnquist and the other Justices
who supported the cause "embarked on an effort to limit the habeas statutes through a series of
judicial reforms." Id. at 64 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); McClersky v. Zant, 111 S.Ct. 1454
(1991); Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991)). As Smith and Jones note in their article
criticizing the court for these legislative-like opinions: "The fact that the Rehnquist Court's
judicial activism, with its powerful effects on outcomes for individual litigants, comes from
justices who made their names as advocates of judicial restraint raises troubling questions about
the hypocrisy detectable in the contradictions between judges' public statements and their actual
behavior." Id. at 76.
298. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148-49.
299. See Smith & Blanco, supra note 15, at 893-94.
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find that hiring undocumented immigrants saves them the cost of
supplying labor and employment law remedies to workers they
mistreat.3 °° If employers are willing to hire undocumented workers
over documented workers, undocumented workers may have a greater
incentive to come to the United States in search of work because there
will simply be more work available to them upon arrival. In addition,
influx of illegal immigrants aside, those illegal workers that are here
already will find themselves more competitive among opportunist
employers than their legal worker counterparts.
Overall, by providing immigrants with fewer employment
protections, Hoffman encourages corruption in the labor-market
economy, tacitly condones the exploitation of undocumented workers,
and places the risk associated with this exploitation on the employee
instead of the employer. These results run directly counter to the
purpose of the immigration laws as well as the employment laws,
which together could ensure fair and safe labor practices and
conditions for all employers and employees while preserving jobs for
legal workers. If employers are held equally accountable to
undocumented immigrants and legal employees, employers will have
virtually no incentive to hire undocumented immigrants because there
will be no savings on employment disputes, whereas there will still be
penalties under immigration laws. Therefore, when undocumented
immigrants are equally eligible for remedies under the employment
laws, regardless of how many illegal immigrants come to the United
States, they will be less competitive with legal workers and IRCA's
purpose will be furthered. Most importantly, the courts will not be
condoning the exploitation and abuse of undocumented workers.
V. CONCLUSION
Hoffman represents a significant departure from the text and the
legislative intent of IRCA, the primary federal statute regulating the
employment of immigrants. Hoffman has created additional,
unnecessary ways to investigate IRCA violations, and it will
eventually undermine IRCA. Courts and agencies are limiting
Hoffman to its facts and generating a body of case law that is
reminiscent of Justice Breyer's dissent in Hoffman. In particular, the
majority of courts emphasize that the labor and employment law
remedies, if applied to undocumented as well as legal workers, help to
deter employers from exploiting the illegal workforce. Therefore,
these remedies help to implement the policies behind IRCA.
300. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 154.
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Ultimately, the courts and agencies have asserted that
undocumented workers are only ineligible to collect backpay for
wrongful termination claims under the NLRA if they are
undocumented during the backpay period and if the backpay period is
for work not performed. Immigrants are only ineligible for
reinstatement under the NLRA if they are undocumented at the time
of the reinstatement. In addition, although under Hoffman
immigration status is relevant to determining eligibility for backpay
for work not performed and to determining eligibility for
reinstatement, the Court has not stated that immigration status is
relevant to other kinds of remedies under labor and employment laws.
In fact, careful analysis of the stated goal of the Court suggests that
immigration status must not be found relevant to any other
employment or labor law dispute because to do so would encourage
employers to violate both immigration and employment laws in
pursuit of cheaper labor.
The sheer volume of cases that Hoffman spawned should not be
overlooked. The opinion has been confusing to some courts and has
tempted numerous employer defendants to fight their employees'
legitimate labor and employment law claims based on the misguided
interpretation that undocumented immigrants are not entitled to any
employment remedies. For this reason alone, Hoffman should be
overturned.
Hoffman should also be overturned because it fails to follow the
language of the statute and the underlying legislative intent. Chief
Justice Rehnquist all but ignored the existing enforcement
mechanisms as they are written in IRCA and the NLRA, deciding
that NLRA claims for backpay for work not performed should enable
a person's immigration status to be exposed in discovery-despite the
fact that neither IRCA nor the NLRA authorizes such an inquiry.
Finally, the threat of this discovery will deter undocumented
immigrants from bringing labor and employment law claims, which
will undermine the purpose of IRCA by making undocumented
immigrants more attractive to employers. It will also undermine the
employment laws, which are designed to create workplaces that
comply with standards for all workers. Thus, to preserve the integrity
of IRCA and to minimize negative effects on all persons in American
places of work, Hoffman must be limited until it is overturned by the
Court or Congress corrects the problems caused by Hoffman.
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